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Continuous-Time Markets
Arman C. Kizilkale and Shie Mannor
Abstract
We analyze the efficiency of markets with friction, particularly power markets. We model the market
as a dynamic system with (dt; t ≥ 0) the demand process and (st; t ≥ 0) the supply process. Using
stochastic differential equations to model the dynamics with friction, we investigate the efficiency of the
market under an integrated expected undiscounted cost function solving the optimal control problem.
Then, we extend the setup to a game theoretic model where multiple suppliers and consumers interact
continuously by setting prices in a dynamic market with friction. We investigate the equilibrium, and
analyze the efficiency of the market under an integrated expected social cost function. We provide an
intriguing efficiency–volatility no-free-lunch trade-off theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first attempts of privatization and deregulation of power industry took place in the 1980s
starting in Chile and the UK [1]. After the restructuring of power markets in California in the late
1990s, price fluctuations have resulted in an estimate of $45 billion in higher electricity costs,
lost businesses due to long blackouts, and a weakening economic growth according to the Public
Policy Institution of California [2]. Even though such events have been mostly considered as
market failures [3], [4], it was shown in [5] that the occurrence of choke-up prices (the maximum
price a consumer is willing to pay) is intrinsic to markets with friction, and the market mechanism
is efficient in a stylized model. Choke-up prices are observed in current market mechanisms
regardless of being efficient, intrinsic, or market failure; this is undesirable and costly.
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2Dynamic pricing in electricity markets have interesting characteristics. Locational Marginal
Pricing (LMP) schemes may determine very high prices for a region while a neighbour region
might be assigned a low or even a negative price for the same amount of energy, where the
supplier is actually willing to pay to consumers for the power they use. The constraints due
to transmission congestion, voltage and thermal constraints, Kirchoff’s Laws and start-up and
shut-down costs are the main reasons behind excess and lack of supply which cause volatile
prices [6].
As shown in [5], the current deregulated market mechanism is efficient with respect to the
infinite horizon social cost. However, the definition of efficiency depends on the social cost
function defined. Many models do not penalize volatility in their cost functions. One can define
volatility as rapid or unexpected changes in the price process. Several models of deterministic
and stochastic volatility have been studied in the economics literature including the famous
deterministic Black-Scholes formula [7], and the stochastic Heston’s extension [8], SABR [9]
and GARCH [10] models. We are going to adopt a much simpler definition of volatility since
our goal is to give a specialized analysis of volatility in power markets.
Several authors studied efficiency in power markets. Even though most studies are based
on static frameworks, it was shown in [11] that under ramping constraints, markets might face
prices not necessarily equal to the marginal cost price. A dynamic game model based on duopoly
markets is analyzed in [12], and a dynamic competitive equilibrium for a stochastic market model
is formulated and the role of volatility for the value of wind generation is presented in [13].
We model the power market through continuous dynamics and an integrated undiscounted
cost function. The problem is presented as an optimal control problem, and the control action
is defined as an increment process applied by the regulator. The HJB equation is solved and the
resulting optimal control is presented. As a special case, in the class of linear quadratic cost
functions, we analytically show that there is a trade-off between efficiency and non-volatility. In
the second part of the paper we take a decentralized approach and define the market as a dynamic
linear quadratic game among individual decision maker supplier and consumer agents. The agents
are coupled through the price process. We show that this price process can be estimated, and
the agents can calculate their best response actions based on this estimation. We show that these
best response actions constitute an equilibrium and the trade-off theorem between efficiency and
non-volatility is shown to hold in this dynamic game model as well.
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3In the first part of the paper we suggest a dynamic optimization framework for power markets:
in Sec. II, we introduce the model we are going to use for the centralized control model. Demand
(dt; t ≥ 0), supply (st; t ≥ 0) and price (pt; t ≥ 0) processes are defined for the social cost
optimizer regulator agent R with the corresponding cost function. In Sec. III, we present the
optimal control that leads to a volatile price process. In Sec. IV, we define volatility and modify
the social cost function to account for it. We solve the dynamic stochastic optimization problem
for linear dynamics and a quadratic cost function and present the closed form solution. We show
that there is a trade-off that can be quantified between efficiency and non-volatility, and present
supporting simulations. In the second part of the paper we suggest a dynamic game-theoretic
optimization framework: in Sec. V, the consumer agents Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, with their dynamics
(dit; t ≥ 0), the supplier agents Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N s with their dynamics (sit; t ≥ 0), and the price
process (pt; t ≥ 0) are defined with the corresponding cost functions for the consumers and
suppliers. In this framework there is no regulator agent: the price process is solely determined
in the market mechanism through the actions of the consumers and suppliers [14]. In Sec. VI,
we first show the existence of best response actions for the game model, we present the closed
form solutions, and finally we analyze the equilibrium properties of the system. In Sec. VI-E,
we define volatility for this model, and show that the trade-off theorem can be extended to the
multi-player game setup. We present supporting simulations in Sec. VI-F and conclude in Sec.
VII.
II. MODEL
In this section we define the optimization problem for the social cost optimizer in power
markets. Here we call the optimizer the “regulator” (agent R). We define the three dimensional
state process (xt : xt = (dt, st, pt)>; t ≥ 0). We have (dt; t ≥ 0), the demand process, (st; t ≥ 0),
the supply process, and (pt; t ≥ 0), the price process. Demand and supply dynamics are defined
as
ddt =f
d(dt, pt)dt+ σddw
d
t , t ≥ 0,
dst =f
s(st, pt)dt+ σsdw
s
t , t ≥ 0,
(1)
using deterministic continuous functions fd and f s with (wdt ; t ≥ 0) and (wst ; t ≥ 0), standard
Wiener processes. The function fd is allowed to be a function of d and p, values of demand
and price, and f s is allowed to be a function of s and p, values of supply and price processes.
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4We employ the following assumptions on the functions fd and f s in (1). The first assumption
A1 reflects friction for power markets. This assumption ensures that the instantaneous change in
demand and supply processes with respect to a price change is constrained. This is one of the
key properties of power dynamics: the suppliers and consumers are unable to respond to abrupt
changes in the system instantly. The reason for the supplier’s sluggishness is slow ramp up in
power production, whereas for the consumers it is usually not handy or very complicated and
costly to startup and shutdown a running machine or a household. The second assumption, A2,
reflects natural characteristics of demand and supply dynamics: demand is a decreasing function
of the price, whereas supply is an increasing function of the price.
A1: For constant C1 > 0, fd(0, 0) ≤ C1, f s(0, 0) ≤ C1 and∣∣∣∣∂fd∂p
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∂f s∂p
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C1.
An immediate example is a linear function of the form f(x, p) = A(t)x+B(t)p with A, B of
class C1([0, T ]).
A2: fd is a strictly decreasing function of p, whereas f s is strictly increasing.
This assumption ensures that an increase in price is reflected on the deterministic portion of
decreasing demand dynamics and increasing supply dynamics.
We also adopt the assumption below for initial values of the processes and the disturbance
process:
A3: {d0, s0, p0 ∈ R} are mutually independently distributed bounded initial conditions, and
{wd, ws} are mutually independent and independent of the initial conditions. Instantaneous
variances of the disturbance processes, σ2d, σ
2
s , are bounded.
We adopt the stepwise price adjustment model [15] for the optimizer (so called regulator agent
R), where the bounded input control process (ut; t ≥ 0) controls the amount of the increment.
The price process controlled by agent R’s input is defined as
dpt = utdt, |ut| ≤ umax, t ≥ 0. (2)
The actions of R is the set {u : |u| < umax, u ∈ R, umax > 0} which is simply the constrained
price adjustment. R observes the demand and supply processes and taking into consideration
their dynamics, cost function and the constraint on price increment, takes an action in terms of
increasing or decreasing the power price. This action is intended to control market dynamics by
only applying increments on the price process.
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5Following [5], the individual loss functions of the consumer and supplier are defined respec-
tively:
gd(d, s, p) = p · s− v ·min(d, s) + cbo(r),
gs(d, s, p) = c(s)− p · s.
Here, c(s) ∈ C2b : R→ R+, with polynomial growth with power k1 or less, i.e., |c(s)| ≤ |c|(1 +
sk1), where C2b denotes the family of all bounded functions which are twice differentiable. The
function c(s) is the production cost, and is strictly convex and strictly increasing with respect
to s. One needs to work on a realistic production cost function in order to have a reasonable
power market model. We note that in real power markets, production cost is not a convex
function. The startup and shutdown costs, transmission line constraints, weather fluctuations all
affect the production cost function. However, if one neglects the startup and shutdown costs, the
cost function resembles a convex function [11, see Figure 1]. For our model we will assume a
continuous convex cost. The constant v ∈ (0,∞) is the value the consumer obtains for a unit of
power. The blackout is denoted by cbo(r) ∈ C2b : R→ R+, with polynomial growth with power
k2 or less, i.e., |cbo(r)| ≤ |cbo|(1 + rk2), is convex, zero on [0,∞) and strictly decreasing on
(−∞, 0), where r denotes the reserve, r := s − d. In other words, if the total consumption in
the system can not be met, blackout cost is paid. In the spot market, the consumer, D, pays p ·s,
the price of all the supply bought, to the supplier, S. Note that v is multiplied by the supplied
portion of his demand. Blackout cost cbo(·) is a function of the unmet demand. Further note that
the supplier S pays for all the cost of production, and gains unit price multiplied with all the
units of supply bought by the consumer agent D. Finally, we employ the following integrated
expected social cost function that is simply the sum of the consumer D and the supplier S loss
functions integrated in time:
J(x, u) = E
∫ T
0
[−v ·min(dt, st) + c(st) + cbo(rt)] dt. (3)
In the section that follows, we consider the optimality of the cost function presented above with
the dynamics (1), the control (2) and the cost function (3) under A1, A2 and A3.
III. CENTRALIZED CONTROL FORMULATION
In this section we analyze the optimal control problem in terms of the state vector x :=
(d, s, p)>. As stated before, this is a centralized control problem for the regulator agent R. In
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6principle R’s objective is to regulate demand and supply processes using the price increments
as the control tool, so that the best social outcome is achieved. In this section we show that
the optimal control of the regulator is a “bang-bang” control, which leads to volatile prices. We
write (1) and (2) in vector form with stochastic dynamics as
dx = ψdt+Gdω, t ≥ 0, (4)
where ω is a 3× 1 standard Wiener process. We set x := (d, s, p)>, ψ := (f>(·), u)> and,
f(d, s, p) =
 fd(d, p)
f s(s, p)
 , G =

σd 0 0
0 σs 0
0 0 0
 .
The loss function of (3) is rewritten here as g(x) = g(d, s, p) = −v·min(d, s)+c(s)+cbo(s−d).
The admissible control for the regulator is specified as U = {u(·) : u adapted to σ(xs, s ≤ t)
and u(t) ∈ U = [−umax, umax], t ≥ 0}. Therefore, the regulator can at most increase or decrease
the price with unit umax and −umax at each iteration. Finally, the cost associated with (4) and
a control u is specified to be J(x0, u) = E[
∫ T
0
g(dt, st, pt)dt]. Further, we set the value function
V (0, x0) , inf
u∈U
J(x0, u). (5)
The theorem that follows claims the existence and uniqueness of the optimal control to the
problem (5).
Theorem 3.1: There exists a unique uˆ ∈ U such that J(x0, uˆ) = infu∈U J(x0, u), where
x0 = (d0, s0, p0)
> is the initial state at time t0 = 0, and if u˜ ∈ U is another control such
that J(x0, u˜) = J(x0, uˆ), then PΩ(u˜s 6= uˆs) > 0 only on a set of times s ∈ [0, T ] of Lebesgue
measure zero.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix I.
Now that we have shown the existence and uniqueness of a control, we check for approaches
to compute the optimal solution. For a function class G: (i) V ∈ C([0, T ] × R3), (ii) |V | ≤
Cv(1 + d
k1 + sk2) where Cv, k1, k2 depend on V , (iii) V (T, x) = 0, we write the HJB Equation
− ∂V
∂t
+ sup
u∈U
{
−∂
>V
∂x
ψ
}
− 1
2
Tr
(
∂2V
∂x2
GG>
)
− g(·) = 0. (6)
A classical solution to the HJB Equation (6) does not exist as GG> is not of full rank in (4)
[16]. Therefore, viscosity solutions are adopted.
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7Definition 3.1: Viscosity solution: [17, Sec. 4, Def. 5.1]
A function v(t, x) ∈ C([0, T ] × R3) is a viscosity subsolution to the HJB equation (6) if
v|t=T ≤ 0, and for any φ(t, z) ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×R3), whenever v− φ obtains a local maximum at
(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R3, we have
− ∂φ
∂t
+ sup
u∈U
{
−∂
>φ
∂x
ψ
}
− 1
2
Tr
(
∂2φ
∂x2
GG>
)
− g(·) ≤ 0. (7)
A function v(t, x) ∈ C([0, T ]× R3) is called a viscosity supersolution to (6) if v|t=T ≥ 0, and
whenever v − φ takes a local minimum at (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R3, in (7) the inequality is changed
to “ ≥ ”. A value function v(t, x) is a viscosity solution if it is a viscosity subsolution and a
viscosity supersolution.
Theorem 3.2: The value function defined in (5) is the unique viscosity solution to the HJB
equation (6) in the class G.
Proof: H4.1 and H4.2 of [18] are satisfied. Theorem 4.1 of [18] proves that V defined in
(5) is a viscosity solution to the HJB equation (6), and Theorem 4.3 of [18] proves that the
solution is a unique solution to (6) in the class G.
A. Perturbation Method
In order to make the GG> matrix full rank, we add (1/2)2(∂2V/∂p2) to (6) [19]. For a
function class G ′: (i) V ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×R3), (ii) |V | ≤ Cv(1+dk1 +sk2) where Cv, k1, k2 depend
on V , (iii) V (T, x) = 0, we write the HJB Equation
− ∂V
p
∂t
− ∂V
p
∂d
fd(d, p)− ∂V
p
∂s
f s(s, p) + sup
u∈U
{
−∂V
p
∂p
u
}
− 1
2
σ2d
∂2V p
∂d2
− 1
2
σ2s
∂2V p
∂s2
− 1
2
2
∂2V p
∂p2
− g(d, s, p) = 0, (8)
where V p(T, x) = 0.
Lemma 3.3: [20, Sec. 6, Theorem 4] For each k = 1, 2, ...
E|x(t)|k ≤ Ck(1 + E|x(s)|k), s ≤ t ≤ T,
where the constant Ck depends on k, T − s, and ψ.
Lemma 3.4: [19, Lemma 6.2] Let B ⊂ R3 be bounded, V p a solution of (8) in C1,2((0, T )×
R3) with V p continuous in C1,2([0, T ]×R3) and V p(T, x) = 0. Then there exists a constant MB
such that
|V p(t, x)| ≤MB, |V pt | ≤MB for all x ∈ B, 0 ≤ t < T,
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8where the constant MB depends only on B, T , the constant C1 in A1 and c, cbo defined for c(s)
and cbo(r).
Theorem 3.5: The perturbed HJB equation (8) has a unique classical solution in the class G ′
for all  > 0.
Proof: We employ an approximation approach. Let us first take 0 <  < 1. For integer
d ≥ 1, let hd(x) be such that hd(x) = 1 for |x| ≤ d, hd(x) = 0 for |x| ≥ d + 1, and |hdx| ≤ 2.
Let V d be the solution to
− ∂V
d
∂t
− ∂V
d
∂d
fd(d, p)hd(x)− ∂V
d
∂s
f s(s, p)hd(x) + sup
u∈U
{
−∂V
d
∂p
u
}
hd(x)
− 1
2
σ2d
∂2V d
∂d2
− 1
2
σ2s
∂2V d
∂s2
− 1
2
2
∂2V d
∂p2
− g(d, s, p)hd(x) = 0, (9)
where V d(T, x) = 0.
For fixed d0 > 1 and D = (0, T ) × (|x| < d0), for any d ≥ d0, V d(t, x) satisfies (8)
for |x| < d0. Lemma 3.4 ensures that V d, V dd , V ds , V dp are uniformly bounded on D. For any
D′ = (0, T )× (|x| < d′), 0 < d′ < d0, by local estimates
‖V d‖(2)λ,D , ‖V d‖λ,D + ‖V dt ‖λ,D +
3∑
i=1
‖V dxi‖λ,D +
3∑
i,j=1
‖V dxi,xj‖λ,D
is uniformly bounded, where ‖·‖λ,D denotes a Sobolev type Lλ(D) norm, where Lλ(K) denotes
the space of λ-th power integrable functions on K ⊂ Q. Take λ > 3, and by the Ho¨lder estimates,
V dxi satisfies a uniform Ho¨lder condition on any compact subset of D
′. Moreover, V dt , V
d
xi,xj
, d =
d0 + 1, d0 + 2, ..., satisfy a uniform Ho¨lder condition on such a D′. At this point we employ
Arzela-Ascoli theorem and take a subsequence {dkq ; q ≥ 1} such that V dkq , V
dkq
t , V
dkq
xi , V
dkq
xi,xj
converge uniformly to V p, V pt , V pxi , V
p
xi,xj
on D′, respectively, as q →∞, where V p satisfies (8)
and is in the class G ′ due to the growth condition on g and the compactness of U . In the next
theorem, we use the Ito¯’s formula to show that V p is the value function to a related stochastic
control system, and thus it is a unique solution to (8) in the class G ′.
Theorem 3.6: Let x ∈ R3 and  > 0. Define V p as solution to (8) and V as solution to (6)
for the admissible control set U . Then V p → V uniformly on [0, T ].
Proof: For (vt; t ≥ 0) a standard Wiener process, we can define an alternative control action
in the form of a stochastic differential equation dppt = utdt+ dvt. The resulting value function
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9can be shown to be a viscosity solution to (8), and this solution is unique (see Chapter 4, [17]).
For a fixed u, we have P{lim→0 sup0≤t≤T |pp − p| = 0} = 1. We recall from (5) that V (t, x) is
the infimum of J(x, u) among non-anticipative controls in U . Let k1, k2 be as in the polynomial
growth conditions for c(·) and cbo(·), Since U is compact, A1 together with Lemma 3.3 imply
that E|x(t)|k1 and E|x(t)|k2 are bounded uniformly with respect to t ∈ [0, T ) and u ∈ U . It
follows that Jp(x, u) is uniformly bounded. One can use Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem to obtain |Jp(x, u) − J(x, u)| → 0, as  → 0, and V p → V as  → 0 follows. By
adopting Arzela-Ascoli Theorem similar to the methodology that was employed in the proof of
Theorem 3.5, one can obtain V p → V uniformly on [0, T ], as → 0.
This gives us the following result:
Corollary 1: For the function class G ′ the solution u∗ ∈ U to the perturbed HJB Equation (8)
is found as:
u∗ = arg min
u∈U
∂>V p
∂x
ψ = −sgn
(
∂V p
∂p
)
umax, (10)
where u was previously defined as dpt = utdt, t ≥ 0, |ut| ≤ umax.
When we look at the the perturbed HJB Equation (8), the bound |V | ≤ C(1 + dk1 + sk2) is
a direct estimate, the value function is differentiable everywhere in the function class G ′, and
due to the constraint defined on the control action, the optimal control is represented as a bang-
bang control. Hence, the optimal control is found as a single switch. At the boundary we have
V (T, x) = 0. Therefore, one can numerically solve (8).
In Theorem 3.1 we showed the existence of an optimal control to the problem (5). Due to
the problematic nature of stochastic differential equations, we have seen that the solution of
an optimal control in “classical sense” may not exist. This leads us to formulate a suboptimal
approach. The convergence of the suboptimal solution to the optimal solution was shown.
The control is shown to be a simple single switch. This has significant consequences, i.e.,
we proved that the regulator needs to increase the price increment to the possible maximum or
decrease it to the possible minimum depending on the value obtained from (10). Due to A1,
the effect of price on demand and supply is constrained. Therefore, a certain amount of time is
needed in order to adjust the levels of demand and supply in the system. For cases where demand
is much bigger than supply or supply is much bigger than demand, the maximal increment has
to be applied for a long period of time. Hence, volatile prices are the optimal outcome of the
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market with respect to the cost function (3).
Note that A1 is important both for technical reasons and for modeling reasons. In addition to
the fact that A1 models friction, if A1 is removed, the polynomial growth of the value function
also may not be satisfied. Moreover, for a hypothetical frictionless market, a single increment on
price would adjust demand and supply levels to the desired levels instantly; thus, less volatility
would be expected. Indeed, for a completely deterministic frictionless system, volatility would
be zero.
IV. EFFICIENCY–VOLATILITY TRADE-OFF
Non-volatility and efficiency are two desirable properties of power markets. In this section we
show that these two notions contradict each other in a market model with friction. Therefore,
one has to trade-off non-volatility and efficiency in designing the market mechanism.
The optimal control policy for the system (1) and the price process due to the nature of
the optimal control (10) were discussed in the previous section. Since the demand and supply
processes are defined by stochastic differential equations, they fluctuate on their trajectories and
the regulator modifies the price process for the optimal outcome. The highest cost is paid when
the difference between demand and supply is the highest.
In this section we prove that no efficient regulation strategy can exist that maintains a smooth
price process when supply and demand are defined by mean-reverting stochastic differential
equations.
We form a function that penalizes the control action u. Recall the loss function defined in (3).
We adopt the stepwise price adjustment model defined in (2), where the input control process
(ut; t ≥ 0) controls the amount of the increment. The cost associated with the system is defined
as
J(x0, u) = E
∫ T
0
[g(dt, st, pt) + ru
2
t ]dt, (11)
where we add ru2 to the term (3) and r > 0 is the volatility coefficient. We will prove that if
the volatility coefficient decreases, the expected cost decreases. In other words, if high volatility
is not allowed, the social cost defined in (3) increases.
We define efficiency as the quantity obtained when the expected cost is multiplied by -1
taken out the control action penalizing part: −E ∫ T
0
[g(dt, st, pt)]dt. Volatility on the other hand
is defined by the price fluctuation measured by E
∫ T
0
u2tdt.
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We require one more assumption here:
A4: The supply process (st; t ≥ 0) and the demand process (dt; t ≥ 0) are linear mean-
reverting processes that have bounded variances and admit stationary probability distributions in
case of time invariant means.
As a special case, we study a linear quadratic cost function of the form
J(x0, u) = E
∫ T
0
(x>t Qxt + 2x
>
t D + ru
2
t )dt, (12)
where x := (d, s, p)>, and Q ≥ 0, r > 0 and D are constant values. Employing A4, we have
the dynamics
dxt = ψ(xt, ut)dt+Gdwt, t ≥ 0,
dxt = (Axt +But + h) dt+Gdwt, t ≥ 0, (13)
where ω is a 3× 1 standard Wiener process, x(0) = x0, and A,B,G are in the form of
A =

∗ 0 ∗
0 ∗ ∗
0 0 0
 , B =

0
0
1
 , G =

σd 0 0
0 σs 0
0 0 0
 , (14)
where ‘∗’ denotes a bounded constant.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of the Optimal Control
From now on, we will work on (12) and (13). We take the admissible control set U2 = {u :
u adapted to σ(xs, s ≤ t) and
∫ T
0
u2tdt < ∞}. The minimum cost-to-go from any initial state
(x) and any initial time (t) is described by the value function which is defined by V (t, x) =
infu∈U2 J(x, u). The optimal control problem is well defined with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) Equation
− ∂V
∂t
+ sup
u∈U2
{
−∂V
∂x
>
ψ − ru2
}
− 1
2
Tr
(
∂2V
∂x2
GG>
)
− x>Qx− 2x>D = 0, (15)
where V (T, x) = 0.
As discussed earlier in Sec. III, due to the lack of uniform parabolicity, standard solutions
may be hard to obtain. Viscosity solutions are adopted in these circumstances. Therefore we add
the term (1/2)2(∂2V/∂p2) to (15) and obtain uniform parabolicity. Equation (15) then becomes
−∂V
p
∂t
+sup
u∈U2
{
−∂V
p
∂x
>
ψ − ru2
}
−1
2
σ2d
∂2V p
∂d2
−1
2
σ2s
∂2V p
∂s2
−1
2
2
∂2V p
∂p2
−x>Qx−2x>D = 0, (16)
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where V p(T, x) = 0.
Equation (16) has a unique solution as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: Equation (16) has a unique classical solution for the admissible control set U2
for all  > 0.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the Proof of Theorem 3.5, therefore omitted.
In the theorem below, we prove that the solution to the perturbed value function (16) converges
uniformly to the value function obtained from the HJB Equation (15).
Theorem 4.2: Let x ∈ R3 and  > 0. Define V p as solution to (16) and V as solution to (15)
for the admissible control set U2. Then V p → V uniformly on [0, T ].
The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.6, therefore omitted.
B. Closed Form Solution
Standard arguments [21, Section 2.3] show that J(x, u) is quadratic in x. Furthermore, at any
point x ∈ R3 and t ∈ [0, T ] the minimum cost-to-go is quadratic in x. Consequently, one can
model V of the form V (t, x) = x>K(t)x+ 2x>S(t) + q(t) that satisfies the boundary condition
V (T, x) = 0, ∀x ∈ R3. Substituting V in (15) and applying first order optimization gives
u∗(t) = −r−1B>[K(t)x(t) + S(t)]. (17)
Solving the closed loop expression we get the ODEs:
K˙ +KA+ A>K −KBr−1B>K +Q = 0, (18)
S˙ + (A−Br−1B>K)>S +Kh+D = 0, (19)
q˙ + 2S>h− S>Br−1B>S + Tr(KGG>) = 0, (20)
with boundary conditions K(T ) = 0, S(T ) = 0 and q(T ) = 0. The linear quadratic optimal
control problem admits a unique optimum feedback controller given by (17) which obtains the
minimum value of the cost function J(x0, u∗) = x>0 K(0)x0 + 2x
>
0 S(0) + q(0).
C. Efficiency–Volatility Trade-off
We would like to look at the relation between r, the volatility coefficient, and the state
penalizing part of the cost function obtained when the volatility term is removed from the
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
13
cost function. We define the state penalizing cost as
J∗sp(x0, u
∗) , E
∫ T
0
[
x>t Qxt + 2x
>
t D
]
dt, (21)
which is denoted as efficiency when multiplied by −1.
Theorem 4.3: Suppose A1-A4 hold. For all x ∈ R3, the state penalizing cost portion (21) of
the cost function (12) using optimal control u∗ is an increasing function of r.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix II.
Increasing the volatility coefficient increases social cost, therefore decreases efficiency, while
decreasing the coefficient decreases the cost, hence increases efficiency. On the other hand
increasing the volatility coefficient decreases volatility, whereas decreasing volatility coefficient
increases volatility. Therefore, there is a trade-off between social efficiency and non-volatility.
D. Simulations
1) Analytical Supportive Simulation: Here we simulate a power market. We use Euler-Maruyama
Method [22] for discretization of the stochastic differential equations. The dynamics equa-
tions are dk+1 = dk − ρ (dk − (β − pk)) ∆t + σwdk
√
∆t, sk+1 = sk − ρ (sk − (pk − γ)) ∆t +
σwsk
√
∆t, pk+1 = pk + uk∆t, where ρ = 0.05,∆t = 0.05, β = 75, γ = 25, σ = 2, tfinal = 100,
with the initial conditions x0 = (d0, s0, p0)> = (25, 25, 50)>. We use mean-reverting processes
with time varying means. The power market we simulate consists of a demand process with
mean (75− p) MWh, and a supply process with mean (p− 25) MWh. Therefore for a price of
$50 per MWh, the supplier is expected to produce 25 MW of power, whereas the demand in
the system is also expected to be 25 MW. In accordance with A2, the demand is an decreasing
function of price, whereas supply is increasing. We calculate dJsp/dr using Theorem 4.3 using a
range of values of r and present the result in Fig. 1, and as expected, it is always positive. Also,
as expected it is a convex function; the value is very high for small values of r and converges to
0 as r increases. Increasing r, the volatility coefficient, corresponds to decreasing volatility which
ends up with a cost increase as dJsp/dr > 0 for all r > 0. In Fig. 2 we present the trade-off
between the efficiency and the non-volatility. The numbers are normalized, and one can see that
in a market with higher volatility the efficiency is higher. Here, on the x axis 0 corresponds to
the situation where r is very large and 1 corresponds to the situation where r = 0. On the y axis,
the corresponding values are normalized, so that 0 is the lowest and 1 is the highest efficiency
that can be obtained.
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Fig. 2. Trade-off
2) Numerical Simulation: Here we present a couple of simulations showing the dynamics
when r = 0.01 and r = 1000. The high volatility in Fig. 3 compared to the low volatility in
Fig. 4 can be observed. One can also notice the effect of volatility on stability.
Also in Fig. 4 the optimal actions of the regulator agent can be observed at 4 points on the
trajectory. At P1, the demand goes up due to stochasticity and the regulator acts with full force
to increase the price, so that stability can be obtained. At P2, price gets high, and the demand
is taken under control; gradually the regulator decreases the price. Between 60 seconds and 80
seconds, we see that supply follows a higher level than the demand. The regulator acts to take
the price down to a local minimum at P3. Then, until P4 the regulator gradually increases the
price until it comes to a local maximum at P4.
Now we present two more simulations with r = 1. The effect of the initial state on the
trajectory is observed here. In Fig. 5 initially, demand is higher than the supply, whereas in Fig.
6 demand is lower than the supply. As expected, the price process becomes very volatile in early
stages to stabilise the market.
Finally, we present an experimental result showing the relation between r and the average
absolute difference between supply and demand dynamics. Recall that high costs are paid when
this difference is high, and as seen in Fig. 7, as r increases the average absolute difference
increases. The x axis is drawn on a logarithmic scale in order to capture the graph on lower
values of r.
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Fig. 3. Dynamics when r = 0.01
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Fig. 4. Dynamics when r = 1000
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Fig. 5. Dynamics when initial supply is higher than demand
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Fig. 6. Dynamics when initial supply is lower than demand
V. DECENTRALIZED CONTROL FORMULATION
We define a continuous dynamic game for Nd consumers and N s suppliers. The agents
continuously submit their bids as price-quantity graphs, and the system announces the resulting
price. Agents buy or sell corresponding shares of supplies according to their bids. One important
notion is that future demand and supply processes are dependent on the price process, which is
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determined instantly by the agents’ price-quantity graphs shaped by their actions.
We have the set of agents N = {D1, ..., DNd , S1, ..., SNs}. We define the family of three
dimensional state processes {(dit, sdit , pdit )>; t ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd} for the consumers and two
dimensional state processes {(sit, psit )>; t ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N s} for the suppliers. The initial
conditions {di0, sdi0 , pdi0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; sj0, psj0 , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s} are mutually independently distributed
bounded random variables which are independent of the standard Wiener processes {wdit , 1 ≤
i ≤ Nd, wsjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s; t ≥ 0}. The process dit is the demand dynamics for agent Di,
the process sdit is the supply it receives, and the process p
di
t is the parameter it applies to its
pre-announced price-quantity graph function φdi(pt; pdit ). For the supplier side sit is the current
supply and psit is the parameter for the price-quantity graph φsi(pt; p
si
t ). Here {φdi , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd}
and {φsi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N s} are the price-quantity graphs that the consumers and the suppliers submit
to the market clearing price functional fm(·) ∈ Cb for the instant price pt determination. The
dynamics for the consumers and the suppliers for t ≥ 0 are given as
ddit =f
di(dit, pt, φ
di(pt; p
di
t ))dt+ σddw
di
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd,
dpdit =u
di
t dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd,
dsit =f
si(sit, pt, φ
si(pt; p
si
t ))dt+ σsdw
si
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N s,
dpsit =u
si
t dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ N s,
pt =f
m({φdi(·, ·), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; φsj(·, ·), 1 ≤ j ≤ N s}).
(22)
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The actions of the agents {udi , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; usj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s} control the size of the
increments for {pdi , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; psj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s}. The functional fdi , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, is allowed
to be a function of di, p and φdi(·, ·), values of the demand of the consumer agent Di, the price
and its price-quantity graph; and f si , 1 ≤ i ≤ N s, is allowed to be a functional of si, p, φsi(·, ·),
values of the supply of the supplier Si, the price and its price-quantity graph.
Following [5], the individual loss function of a consumer and a supplier are defined respec-
tively:
gd(·) =pt · sdit − v ·min(dit, sdit ) + cbo(sdit − dit),
gs(·) =c(sit)− pt · sit.
(23)
Finally, the cost functions associated with each consumer, each supplier and corresponding
control actions udi , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, and usj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s, are specified to be
Jd(d
i
0, s
di
0 , p0, u
di) = E
∫ T
0
[pt · sdit − v ·min(dit, sdit ) + cbo(sdit − dit)]dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd,
Js(s
i
0, p0, u
si) = E
∫ T
0
[c(sit)− pt · sit]dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ N s.
(24)
We employ A3 for initial values and the disturbance processes, and A1 on the functions fdi(·)
and f si(·). Moreover,
A5: fdi(·), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, is a strictly decreasing function of p, whereas f si(·), 1 ≤ i ≤ N s, is
strictly increasing. The price-quantity graphs for the consumers are decreasing functions of pt
in the form of φdi(pt; pdit ) , fφ
di (pdit )− pt, whereas the price-quantity graphs are increasing in
the form of φsi(pt; psit ) , fφ
si (psit ) + pt, for the suppliers. Functions fφ
di (pdit ) and fφ
si (psit ) are
Lipschitz continuous on R with Lipschitz constants Lip(fφdi ), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, and Lip(fφsi ), 1 ≤
i ≤ N s. Consequently, for some γ > 0, η > 0, the market clearing price function fm(·) ∈ Cb :
R→ R is a linear function in the form of fm , (γ/(Nd+N s))·(∑Ndi=1 fφdi (·)+∑Nsi=1 fφsi (·)+η).
This assumption limits the model to a price process parameterized by γ > 0 and η > 0 obtained
by price-quantity graph functions submitted by the consumer and supplier agents: φdi(·), 1 ≤
i ≤ Nd, φsi(·), 1 ≤ i ≤ N s, that are linear functions of pt, t ≥ 0.
A4 is employed: the demand processes {(dit, t ≥ 0); 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd} and the supply processes
{(sit, t ≥ 0); 1 ≤ i ≤ N s} are linear mean-reverting processes that have bounded variances.
As a special case, we consider linear quadratic functions below. The choice of quadratic terms
can be explained by the convexity of the production cost and the blackout cost functions. The
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rest of the cost functions can be arranged in a way that fits the linear parameters of the quadratic
cost functions defined below. We use a penalty function for the control actions and define the
volatility coefficient r. Increasing the volatility coefficient penalizes each agent’s attempt to
change its price-quantity functional; therefore increasing r is equivalent to penalizing volatility
in the market when the system of agents is taken as a mass. The nonlinear curve-fitting problem
is solved in the least-squares sense given the input data and the observed output data, and we
get the following cost functions:
Jd(d
i
0, s
di
0 , p0, u
di) =E
∫ T
0
[
xdit
>
Qdxdit + 2x
di
t
>
Ddit + r(u
di
t )
2
]
dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd,
Js(s
i
0, p0, u
si) =E
∫ T
0
[
xsit
>Qsxsit + 2x
si
t
>Dsit + r(u
si
t )
2
]
dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ N s,
(25)
where xdi := (di, sdi , pdi)>, xsi := (si, psi)>, Qd,s ≥ 0, r > 0 are constant values, and Ddit is
a continuous vector valued function of {xdjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nd, j 6= i; xsjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s} and Dsit is
a continuous vector valued function of {xdjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ Nd; xsjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s, j 6= i}. The cost
functions are coupled: the price functional (dependent on all agents’ actions) enters into the cost
function parameters. Employing A4, the equation system (22) can be written in the form of
dxdit =ψ(x
di
t , u
di
t )dt+G
ddwdit , t ≥ 0,
dxdit =
(
Adixdit +B
dudit + h
di
t
)
dt+Gddwdit , t ≥ 0,
dxsit =ψ(x
si
t , u
si
t )dt+G
sdwsit , t ≥ 0,
dxsit = (A
sixsit +B
susit + h
si
t ) dt+G
sdwsit , t ≥ 0,
(26)
where {wdit , 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, wsit , 1 ≤ i ≤ N s; t ≥ 0} are standard Wiener processes with suitable
dimensions and xdi(0) = xd0, x
si(0) = xs0. The function h
di
t is of the form h
di
t (p
dj
t , 1 ≤ j ≤
Nd, j 6= i; psjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s) and function hsit is of the form hsit (psjt , 1 ≤ j ≤ N s, j 6= i; pdjt , 1 ≤
j ≤ Nd).
The coefficients [Adi,si , Bd,s] ∈ Θ ∈ Rn(n+m), will be called the dynamics parameters.
The variability of dynamics parameters from agent to agent is used to model a heterogeneous
population of agents. Note that the dynamics are coupled among agents only through the price
functional. The price functional enters into hdi and hsi; and is a function on all agents’ price-
quantity graph functions. The following assumption is employed:
A6: The set of dynamics parameters, Θ, is a compact set in the form of Θ ⊂ Rn(n+m).
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VI. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section we first define the value functions for the consumers and the suppliers with the
dynamics (26) and the cost functions (25). We then show the existence of suboptimal solutions
to the HJB equations using the perturbation method. Secondly, we present the closed form
solutions for the HJB equations and the statistical dependence among the agents through the
price process. This dependence leads to an implementation issue which is overcome by a policy
iteration style method applied by each agent to calculate the best response action. Finally, we
show the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game under a fixed
point argument in a system of agents where each agent applies the policy iteration method.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of the Best Response Actions
From now on, we consider (25) and (26). We define the admissible control set, U3, of each
consumer and supplier as the set of all feedback controls adapted to Ft, the σ-field generated
by the agents’ trajectories and the price process {xdiτ , xsjτ , pτ ; 0 ≤ τ ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤
j ≤ N s}. The minimum cost-to-go from any agent’s initial state is described by the value
functions which are defined by V di(0, xdi0 ) = infu∈U3 Jd(x
di
0 , u
di), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; V si(0, xsi0 ) =
infu∈U3 Js(x
si
0 , u
si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N s. Whenever the treatment is the same for both consumers and
suppliers’ value functions V di , V si , we will drop the superscripts. The value function solves the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation:
− ∂V
∂t
+ sup
u∈U3
{
−∂V
∂x
>
ψ − r(u)2
}
− 1
2
Tr
(
∂2V
∂x2
GG>
)
− x>Qx− 2x>Dt = 0, (27)
where V (T, x) = 0.
As discussed before in Section III, due to the lack of uniform parabolicity [17], classical
solutions may be hard to obtain. Viscosity solutions are typically adopted in these circumstances.
In order to approximate the solution we add the term (1/2)2(∂2V/∂p2) to (27) and obtain
uniform parabolicity. We obtain the perturbed value functions V dip and V
si
p :
− ∂V
di
p
∂t
+ sup
u∈U3
{
−∂V
di
p
∂xdi
>
ψdi − r(udi)2
}
− 1
2
σ2d
∂2V dip
∂d2i
− 1
2
σ2sd
∂2V dip
∂sdi2
− 1
2
2
∂2V dip
∂pdi2
− xdi>Qdxdi − 2xdi>Ddit = 0, (28)
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∂V sip
∂t
+ sup
u∈U3
{
−∂V
si
p
∂xsi
>
ψsi − r(usi)2
}
− 1
2
σ2s
∂2V sip
∂s2i
− 1
2
2
∂2V sip
∂psi2
− xsi>Qsxsi − 2xsi>Dsit = 0,
(29)
where V dip (T, x) = 0, and V
si
p (T, x) = 0.
Eqs. (28) and (29) have unique solutions as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1: For all  > 0, Equations (28) and (29) have unique solutions for the admissible
control set U3.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.5, therefore omitted.
In the theorem below, we prove that the solutions to the perturbed value functions V dp and V
s
p
(28), (29) converge uniformly to the value function V obtained from the HJB Equation (27).
Theorem 6.2: For x ∈ R3 or x ∈ R2 suitably and  > 0, if we define Vp as the solution to (28)
or (29) and V as the solution to (27) for the admissible control set U3, then Vp → V uniformly
on [0, T ] as → 0.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof presented for Theorem 3.6, therefore omitted.
B. Closed Form Solution
Standard arguments [21, Section 2.3] show that J(x, u) is quadratic in x. Furthermore, at
any point x ∈ R3 or suitably x ∈ R2 and t ∈ [0, T ], the minimum cost-to-go is quadratic in x.
Consequently, V is of the form V (0, x) = x>K(0)x+2x>S(0)+q(0), that satisfies the boundary
condition V di(T, xdi) = 0, ∀xdi ∈ R3, and V si(T, xsi) = 0, ∀xsi ∈ R2.
Following the same steps in Sec. IV-B we obtain
u∗(t) = −r−1B>[K(t)x(t) + S(t)]. (30)
K and S in (30) are iterated backwards in time, and depend on other agents’ actions on
0 ≤ t ≤ T . This implies that at time t ≥ 0, an agent can not calculate its best response simply
through its own trajectory and the control action history of all the agents on 0 ≤ s ≤ t. The
agents are coupled through the price process, and the full trajectory of the price process needs
to be calculated in order to obtain the best response action. The analysis of the best response of
each agent and the corresponding equilibrium is presented in the next section.
C. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the equilibrium properties. At each time iteration and at each point
in the state space each agent solves the ODEs (18), (19) and (20) for all the consumers and the
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suppliers in the system, calculates their best response actions (30), and simultaneously solves
these equations for each agent to obtain the unique fixed point in the action space. As stated
before, the admissible control set is U3, the set of all feedback controls adapted to Ft, the σ-
field generated by the agents’ trajectories and the price process {xdiτ , xsjτ , pτ ; 0 ≤ τ ≤ t, 1 ≤
i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤ j ≤ N s}. Each individual agent knows the dynamics and cost function parameters
of all agents in the system. Therefore, at a certain time t ≥ 0, and for a given point in the
state space, each agent can solve the ODEs (18), (19) and (20) that depend on all agents, and
get the unique fixed point for the action profile. The state processes of all agents in the system
are statistically dependent due to the price functional; however, at each t ≥ 0, given that all
dynamics and state information is known, the best response calculations for all agents can be
independently calculated by each agent in the system. We show that the system of equations
regarding the best response actions of all agents in the system has a unique solution. We also
present the policy iteration procedure that leads to the unique solution of the system of equations
when applied by all agents in the system. Due to the stochasticity of the system dynamics (26),
this procedure is repeated by each agent until the fixed point is obtained at each time iteration.
The compactness of the parameter set and the boundedness of the price functional ensure the
existence of the fixed point.
A7: [Adi,si , B] ∈ Θ is controllable, [Q1/2, Adi,si ] is observable, and A∗ is a Hurwitz matrix.
For all θ ∈ Θ, all the eigenvalues of A∗(θ) , A(θ) − B(θ)r−1B>(θ)K(θ) have negative real
part; A∗ is continuous over Θ; there exists κ > 0, ρ > 0 such that ‖eA∗(θ)t‖ ≤ κe−ρt, ∀t ≥ 0.
The closed form solution is written for S and K as
S(t) =
∫ T
t
e−A
>∗ (t−τ)K(τ)h(p(τ))dτ +
∫ T
t
e−A
>∗ (t−τ)D(p(τ))dτ , T1pt, (31)
K(t) , T2pt.
where T2 is the solution to the Riccati equation (18).
Since the solution S(t; θ), θ ∈ Θ, to the ordinary differential equation (19), and the solution
K(t; θ), θ ∈ Θ, to the Riccati equation (18) parameterized by θ ∈ Θ are smooth functions of θ
(see [23]), S(t; θ) and K(t; θ) satisfy the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3: Under A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7, we have T1p ∈ Cb[0,∞) and T2p ∈ Cb[0,∞)
for any p(·) ∈ Cb[0,∞).
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Therefore T1 and T2 are bounded continuous maps. With the best response actions applied,
assuming xdi0 = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; xsi0 = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N s, without loss of generality, in the closed
loop we have
Exdit (t) =−
∫ t
0
eA
d∗(t−τ)Bdr−1Bd
>
Sdi(p(τ))dτ +
∫ t
0
eA
d∗(t−τ)hdi(p(τ))dτ , T3pt,
Exsit (t) =−
∫ t
0
eA
s∗(t−τ)Bsr−1Bs>Ssi(p(τ))dτ +
∫ t
0
eA
s∗(t−τ)hsi(p(τ))dτ , T4pt.
(32)
Lemma 6.4: Under A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7, T3p ∈ Cb[0,∞) and T4p ∈ Cb[0,∞) for any
p(·) ∈ Cb[0,∞).
Proof: Due to A7, A∗ is a Hurwitz matrix. Moreover we have shown in Lemma 6.3 that
S(t; θ) is a bounded value in Cb[0,∞). Therefore T3p ∈ Cb[0,∞) and T4p ∈ Cb[0,∞) follows.
Now, we write the price function fm(·) for t ≥ 0:
pt = f
m({φdi(pt; pdit ), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; φsi(pt; psit ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N s}) , T5pt. (33)
The following lemma establishes that T5 defined above is a map from Cb[0,∞) to itself.
Lemma 6.5: Under A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7, we have T5p ∈ Cb[0,∞) for any p ∈ Cb[0,∞).
In the following theorem we show that T5 has a fixed point. Following that we deduce that
in a system of consumers and suppliers with dynamics (26) and cost functions (25) the system
has a unique equilibrium, and this equilibrium is indeed the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
within Markovian strategies. At this point we introduce the following technical assumption:
A8: γκ2
Nd +N s
(
NdM
Lip(fφd )
·
(
1
ρ2
‖Bd‖2r−1
(
MKdMhd +MDd
)
+
1
ρ
Mhd
)
+N sMLip(fφs ) ·
(
1
ρ2
‖Bs‖2r−1
(
MKsMhs +MDs
)
+
1
ρ
Mhs
))
< 1,
where γ > 0 is specified in A5, κ > 0 is specified in A7, ‖Kd(t)‖ ≤ MKd , ‖Ks(t)‖ ≤ MKs
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Mhd = max1≤i≤Nd‖hdi‖, Mhs = max1≤i≤Ns‖hsi‖, MDd = max1≤i≤Nd‖Ddi‖,
MDs = max1≤i≤Ns‖Dsi‖, MLip(fφd ) = max1≤i≤Nd‖Lip(fφ
di )‖, MLip(fφs ) = max1≤i≤Ns‖Lip(fφsi )‖,
Lip(fφ
d
) and Lip(fφs) are the Lipschitz constants respectively for fφdi (·) and fφsi (·) specified
in A5.
This technical assumption ensures the uniqueness of the price process. Note that there is a
trade-off between γ and r in this inequality. A small r means cheaper control actions for the
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agents; therefore, the price process is more likely to be volatile and eventually intractable. This
assumption ensures tractability even for small values of r. Note that numerical results show that
this assumption can be satisfied.
Theorem 6.6: Under A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 and A8, the map T5 : Cb[0,∞)→ Cb[0,∞) has a
unique fixed point which is uniformly Lipschitz continuous on [0,∞).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix III.
The main result of this section immediately follows Theorem 6.6.
Corollary 2: Under A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 and A8, the expected value of the equation system
(22) admits a unique bounded solution.
D. Policy Iteration
We now describe the iterative policy of an agent from its policy space. At time t ∈ [0, T ], for
a fixed iteration number k ≥ 0 and τ ∈ [t, T ], suppose that there is a priori pτ (k) ∈ Cb[0,∞).
Then the best response action (30) of each agent is in the form of u∗τ (k+ 1) = −r−1B>[Kτ (k+
1)xτ (k) + Sτ (k + 1)]. Taking the same steps in the previous section we get the recursion for
pτ (k) as E[pτ (k + 1)] = T5pτ (k). The procedure can be applied for all t ≤ τ ≤ T , and the
recursion converges to a unique p∗(τ), t ≤ τ ≤ T , and once the price trajectory is obtained,
each agent is able to calculate its best response action (30). The existence and uniqueness of
p∗(τ), t ≤ τ ≤ T , are shown in Theorem 6.6 by use of a fixed point argument. This procedure
is independently performed by each agent in the system at each time iteration. The following
Proposition may be proved by Theorem 6.6.
Proposition 6.7: Under A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 and A8, limk→∞ pτ (k) = p∗(τ) for any p∗ ∈
[0,∞) where p∗ is the solution to (22).
Before we present the subgame perfect equilibrium theorem, we employ the assumption below:
A9: Agents can only use Markovian strategies, i.e., we rule out many non-myopic subgame
perfect equilibria mostly based on future punishments such as grim-trigger strategies in repeated
and dynamic games [24].
A Markovian strategy γi of a player is defined to be a strategy where for each t, γi(t, x) depends
on Ft, the σ-field generated by the agents’ trajectories and the price process {xdiτ , xsjτ , pτ ; 0 ≤
τ ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤ j ≤ N s} only through t, {xdit , xsjt , pt; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤ j ≤ N s}.
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Let us define Γ to be the class of mappings γ : [0, T ] × R3 → R with the property that
u(t) = γ(t, x) is adapted to Ft, the σ-field generated by the agents’ trajectories and the price
process {xdiτ , xsjτ , pτ ; 0 ≤ τ ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤ j ≤ N s}. A subgame perfect equilibrium of
the dynamic game with the set of agents N with dynamics (22), and with the cost functions
(24) is a strategy profile γ∗ ∈ Γ such that for any history h, the strategy profile γ∗|h is a Nash
equilibrium of the subgame based on the history h.
Under A9 the iterative update of agents’ policies results in the system’s unique subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Corollary 3: Under A1, A3-A9, for agents with dynamics (22), the action profile obtained
when all agents apply (30) at any t ≥ 0, with the iterative procedure described above is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
The system has a unique equilibrium within Markovian strategies, and the action profile
corresponding to the equilibrium can be obtained by an iterative algorithm applied by each agent.
The equilibrium is shown by use of a fixed point argument, and the procedure is explained by
a policy iteration methodology. At each time iteration each agent looks at the future, estimates
the price trajectory, and calculates the best response action. This procedure leads to the unique
best response profile, and the equilibrium is obtained.
E. Efficiency–Volatility Trade-off
We would like to look at the relation between the social cost function and the action penalizing
parameter, volatility coefficient, r. The social cost function is defined as J , J({di, sdi , sj, p, udi , usj ,
1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤ j ≤ N s}) = ∑Ndi=1 Jd(di, sdi , p, udi) +∑Nsi=1 Js(si, p, usi),
J =
Nd∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
(
xdit
>
Qdxdit + 2x
di
t
>
Ddit + r(u
di
t )
2
)
dt+
Ns∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
(
xsit
>Qsxsit + 2x
si
t
>Dsit + r(u
si
t )
2
)
dt.
(34)
We define efficiency as the quantity obtained when the social cost is multiplied by −1.
Volatility on the other hand is defined by the price fluctuation measured by
∑Nd
i=1 E
∫ T
0
(udit )
2dt+∑Ns
i=1 E
∫ T
0
(usit )
2dt.
Then we remove ru2 from the cost function and define the state penalizing social cost under
the best response actions (30) applied both by the consumers and the suppliers. Note that the
social cost is merely a summation of the same type of cost functions; therefore the analysis of
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a single summand term can be easily carried onto the whole cost function. The state penalizing
social cost function is written:
J∗sp ,
Nd∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
(
xdit
>
Qdxdit + 2x
di
t
>
Ddit
)
dt+
Ns∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
(
xsit
>Qsxsit + 2x
si
t
>Dsit
)
dt. (35)
Theorem 6.8: For all x ∈ R3, or x ∈ R2 suitably, the state penalizing cost portion (35) of the
cost function (34) using the best response solution u∗ is an increasing function of r.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3; therefore not provided.
Corollary 4: Suppose A1, A3-A9 hold. Let the price adjustment of the consumers and the
suppliers be penalized with a factor of the volatility coefficient. Increasing the volatility coefficient
increases the integrated social cost, while decreasing the coefficient decreases the cost.
Therefore, there is an inherent trade-off between social efficiency and non-volatility.
F. Simulations
Here we simulate a power market. We use Euler-Maruyama Method [22] for discretization
of the stochastic differential equations. The dynamics equations for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd, 1 ≤ j ≤
N s are dik+1 = d
i
k − ρ (dik − (β − pk)) ∆t + σwdik
√
∆t, pdik+1 = p
di
k + u
di
k ∆t, s
j
k+1 = s
j
k −
ρ
(
sjk − (pk − psjk )
)
∆t+σw
sj
k
√
∆t, p
sj
k+1 = p
sj
k +u
sj
k ∆t, pk = (
∑
1≤l≤Nd p
dl
k +
∑
1≤l≤Ns p
sl
k )/(N
d+
N s), where ρ = 0.05,∆t = 0.05, β = 75, σ = 2, tfinal = 500, with the initial conditions
(ddi0 , p
di
0 )
> = (25, 50)>, (ssi0 , p
si
0 )
> = (25, 50)>, p0 = 50.
We present a couple of figures showing the dynamics when r = 0.005 and r = 100. The
high volatility of the price in Fig. 8 compared to the low volatility of the price in Fig. 9 can
be observed. One can also notice the effect of volatility on stability. In Fig. 8, the aggregate
demand and aggregate supply dynamics follow a much closer path, whereas in Fig. 9, the gap
between these two processes turns out to be fluctuating. As the highest costs are paid when the
absolute difference between the aggregate demand and supply is the highest, the social cost paid
in Fig. 9 is larger than in Fig. 8.
VII. CONCLUSION
The no friction assumption of the traditional market mechanisms is a significant factor in
terms of analyzing dynamic continuous time markets. Friction adds complexity to the analysis
of the market, and volatility is an inevitable result of friction as our stylized model shows.
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Fig. 8. r=0.005 Fig. 9. r=100
The market model has been defined as a social cost optimization problem for the regulator,
and it has been shown that a simple linear closed form control exists. As a special case we
studied quadratic cost functions and have shown that there is a trade-off between social efficiency
of the market and non-volatility. High efficiency requires a volatile market, whereas one has to
compromise efficiency in order to get stability in prices. Then we have extended the optimization
model to a dynamic game theoretic framework and have shown the same efficiency–volatility
trade-off for this model with closed form best response actions. The complexity increases as the
number of agents in the system increases; therefore, this leads to an implementation problem.
In future work we will apply mean field methods and study the limit behaviour of a large
population model of suppliers and consumers to precompute the price process, therefore decrease
the computational complexity.
Also, in the current model, it is assumed that each agent in the system knows all the dynamical
and cost function parameters of other agents in the system. Adaptation and learning methods
will be applied in future work for a system of agents that start with partial statistical information
on other agents’ dynamical and cost function parameters. The adapting (or learning) agents will
be allowed to only observe a random partial fraction of the population of agents’ trajectories
and the price process. Convergence rates will be studied and properties of the equilibrium will
be investigated in this setup. The behaviour of the efficiency–volatility theorem will also be
analyzed.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Proof:
The existence of the solution follows a standard argument [17, Chapter 2, Theorem 5.1]. The
continuity of V (x) is based on the continuous dependence of the cost function on the initial
state values.
The plan of the proof is as follows: first, to show the uniqueness of the control, we show that
the cost function J is strictly convex in p. By contradiction: we show that the probability of two
distinct control action trajectories leading to the same price process p is of Lebesgue measure
zero. This proves uniqueness.
We have
J(t, xt, u) = E
∫ T
t
[−vmin(dτ , sτ ) + c(sτ ) + cbo(dτ − sτ )]dτ,
which can be written for ∆t > 0
J(t, xt, u) = [−vmin(dt, st) + c(st) + cbo(dt − st)]∆t+ E
∫ T
∆t
(.)dτ.
The first part is independent of pt. We have
J(t, xt, u) = (·) + E
∫ T
∆t
[−vmin(dτ , sτ ) + c(sτ ) + cbo(dτ − sτ )]dτ.
For s = τ −∆t,
J(t, xt, u) = (·) + E
∫ T−∆t
0
[−vmin(ds + fd(ds, ps)∆t+ dwds , ss + f s(ss, ps)∆t+ dwss)+
c(ss + f
s(ss, ps)∆t+ dw
s
s) + cbo(ds + f
d(ds, ps)∆t+ dw
d
s − ss − f s(ss, ps)∆t− dwss)]ds.
Therefore, J(t, xt, u) = (·) + E
∫ T−∆t
0
[gs+∆t]ds. For ds+∆t < ss+∆t, as p increases, Egs+∆t also
increases and tends to∞ as p→∞. As p decreases, Egs+∆t decreases and tends to g∗ as p→ p∗,
where E(ds+∆t = ss+∆t). For ds+∆t > ss+∆t, as p decreases, gs+∆t increases and tends to ∞ as
p→∞. As p increases, gs+∆t decreases and tends to g∗ as p→ p∗, where E(ds+∆t = ss+∆t).
We have J(ds, ss, 12(pˆs+ p˜s), u) ≤ 12 [J(ds, ss, pˆs, u)+J(ds, ss, p˜s, u)], and the inequality holds
on A , {(s, ω), p˜s 6= pˆs}. Let E
∫ T
0
1p˜s 6=pˆsds > 0, i.e., A has a strictly positive measure. Then
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the control (1/2)(uˆ+ u˜) ∈ U gives
J
(
x0,
1
2
(uˆ+ u˜)
)
<
1
2
[J(x0, uˆ) + J(x0, u˜)],
= inf
u∈U
J(x0, u).
which is a contradiction. Therefore, E
∫ T
0
1p˜s 6=pˆsds = 0. The trajectories of ps are continuous
with probability 1 by (2). Hence, we have p˜s − pˆs ≡ 0 on [0, T ] with probability 1. We have∫ s
0
(u˜τ − uˆτ )dτ = p˜s − pˆs, for all s ∈ [0, T ], by (2). Hence, with probability 1, u˜s − uˆs = 0
a.e. on [0, T ] which is equivalent to E
∫ T
0
1u˜s 6=uˆsds =
∫ T
0
PΩ(u˜s 6= uˆs)ds = 0. Consequently,
PΩ(u˜s 6= uˆs) > 0 only of Lebesgue measure zero on s ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, uniqueness is proved.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Proof: If we were to only find dJ(x, u∗)/dr, we would calculate it from
dJ(x, u∗)
dr
= x>0
dK(0)
dr
x0 + 2x
>
0
dS(0)
dr
+
dq(0)
dr
.
However, we are interested in dJsp(x, u∗)/dr.
The quadratic cost function was shown (12) to be J(x, u∗) =
∫ T
0
[x∗>(t)Qx∗(t) + 2x∗>(t)D+
r(u∗(t))2]dt. We seek to compute dJsp(x, u∗)/dr. However, the calculations are easier for dJsp(x, u∗)/dγ,
where γ = r−1. We have
dJsp(x, u
∗)
dt
∣∣
t=T
= fJ(x) =
(
x∗>(t, γ)Qx∗(t, γ) + 2x∗>(t, γ)D
) ∣∣
t=T
, (36)
with the initial condition Jsp(x, u∗)|t=0 = 0. We take the derivative of (36) with respect to γ and
changing the order of differentiation
d
dt
(
dJsp(x, u
∗)
dγ
)
=
(
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
)>
Qx∗(t, γ)
+ x∗>(t, γ)Q
(
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
)
+ 2
(
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
)>
D,
dJsp(x0, u
∗)
dγ
= 0. (37)
In order to get (37), we need dx∗(t, γ)/dγ. Using (13) and (17) we obtain
dx∗(t, γ) = fx(x∗(t, γ), γ,K(t, γ), S(t, γ))dt+Gdω =(
Ax∗(t, γ)−BγB>(K(t, γ)x∗(t, γ) + S(t, γ))+ h) dt+Gdω, x(0) = 0. (38)
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Taking the derivative of (38) with respect to γ and changing the order of differentiation
d
dt
(
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
)
= A
(
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
)
−BγB>K(t, γ)
(
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
)
−BγB>dK(t, γ)
dγ
x∗(t, γ)
−BB>K(t, γ)x∗(t, γ)−BγB>dS(t, γ)
dγ
−BB>S(t, γ), dx(0)
dγ
= 0.
(39)
In order to calculate (39), we need to calculate dK(t, γ)/dγ = fK(K(t, γ), γ) and
dS(t, γ)/dγ = fS(K(t, γ), γ, S(t, γ)).
The differential equation for K(t, γ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and S(t, γ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , were shown to be
(18) and (19). Using the same changing order of differention technique, we get:
d
dt
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)
=
∂fK(·)
∂K(t, γ)
dK(t, γ)
dγ
+
∂fK(·)
∂γ
,
dK(T )
dγ
= 0, (40)
d
dt
(
dS(t, γ)
dγ
)
=
∂fS(·)
∂S(t, γ)
dS(t, γ)
dγ
+
∂fS(·)
∂γ
+
∂fS(·)
∂K(t, γ)
dK(t, γ)
dγ
,
dS(T )
dγ
= 0. (41)
The differential equations (40) and (41) are expanded as
d
dt
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)
= −
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)
A− A>
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)
+
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)
BγB>K(t, γ)
+K(t, γ)BγB>
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)
+K(t, γ)BB>K(t, γ); and
(42)
d
dt
(
dS(t, γ)
dγ
)
= −A>dS(t, γ)
dγ
+ (BγB>K(t, γ))>
dS(t, γ)
dγ
+
(
dK(t, γ)
dγ
)>
BγB>S(t, γ) +K>(t)BB>S(t, γ)− dK(t, γ)
dγ
h.
(43)
Therefore we have all the components to calculate dx∗(t, γ)/dγ (39). Consequently, we are
ready to calculate dJsp(x, u∗)/dγ (37). One can write
dJsp(x, u
∗)
dγ
=
dJsp(x, u
∗)
d(f(r))
=
dJsp(x, u
∗)
f ′(·)dr =
dJsp(x, u
∗)
dr
−1
r−2
, where γ = r−1. (44)
From (44) one can calculate dJsp(x, u∗)/dr. Here we use the specific nature of matrices A and
B given in (14) and show analytically that dJsp(x, u∗)/dr > 0, and it is an increasing function of
time. Here we show the derivations calculated at the steady state values of K, S, and x. However,
the calculations also hold for any 0 < t ≤ T . At steady state only the terms involving the noise
variables effect dJsp(x, u∗)/dγ. Apart from that for all the other terms dJsp(x, u∗)/dγ = 0. We
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solve the stochastic differential equation (39) and obtain
dx∗(t, γ)
dγ
=
∫ t
0
e(A−BγB
>K(τ,γ))(t−τ)
[(
−BγB>dK(τ, γ)
dγ
−BB>K(τ, γ)
)
x∗(τ, γ)
−BγB>dS(τ, γ)
dγ
−BB>S(τ, γ)
]
dτ.
(45)
The stochastic differential equation for x∗ in (45) gives the solution
x∗(τ, γ) =
∫ τ
0
e(A−BγB
>K(s,γ))(τ−s)(−BγB>S(s, γ) + h) +
∫ τ
0
e(A−BγB
>K(s,γ))(τ−s)GdW (s).
We now inject these two equations into (37), solve the stochastic differential equation, arrange
the terms, and obtain
R1(t) =
∫ t
s
e(A−BγB
>K(τ,γ))
>
(τ−s)
(
−BγB>dK(τ, γ)
dγ
−BB>K(τ, γ)
)>
·
e(A−BγB
>K(τ,γ))
>
(s−τ)dτ,
R2(t) =
∫ t
0
e(A−BγB
>K(τ,γ))(t−s)GG>R1(t)e(
A−BγB>K(τ,γ))>(t−s)ds,
dJsp(x, u
∗)
dγ
= 2
∫ T
0
Tr(R2(t) ∗Q)dt.
(46)
All the terms in (46) are positive except for (−BγB>dK(τ, γ)/dγ − BB>K(τ, γ))>. The
matrix BB> is an all zeros matrix except for 1 at the rightbottom entry. The multiplication
with dK(τ, γ)/dγ and K(τ, γ) give positive values due to (14) that solve (40) and (18). Hence,
R1(t) < 0.
Therefore, one obtains dJsp(x, u∗)/dγ < 0 for all γ > 0. As dJsp(x, u∗)/dr = −(dJsp(x, u∗)/dγ)r−2,
one obtains dJsp(x, u∗)/dr > 0 for all r > 0.
Also, one can see the role of the noise variance on the trade-off. G in (46) is the noise variance
matrix; and notice that an increase in the noise variance leads to an increase in dJ∗sp/dr.
Hence, the state penalizing cost portion (21) of the cost function (12) in the closed loop using
the optimal control u∗ is an increasing function of r. Thus, Theorem 4.3 is proved.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.6
Proof: We rewrite the operator T5 (33) here again:
pt = f
m({φdi(pt; pdit ), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd; φsi(pt; psit ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N s})
pt , γ ·
(∑Nd
i=1 f
φdi (·) +∑Nsi=1 fφsi (·)
Nd +N s
+ η
)
.
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T5 is a map from the Banach space Cb[0,∞) to itself. For any x, y ∈ Cb[0,∞), injecting
Exdi ,Exsi from (32) and S(·) from (31) we have
‖(T5x− T5y)(t)‖
≤ γ‖x− y‖∞
Nd +N s
·
(
Nd∑
i=1
fφ
di
(
−
∫ t
0
eA
d∗(t−τ)Bdr−1Bd
>·(∫ T
t
eA
d∗(s−t)Kd(s)hdids+
∫ T
t
eA
d∗(s−t)Ddids
)
dτ +
∫ t
0
eA
d∗(t−τ)hdidτ
)
+
Ns∑
i=1
fφ
si
(∫ t
0
eA
s∗(t−τ)Bsr−1Bs>
(∫ T
t
eA
s∗(s−t)Ks(s)hsids
+
∫ T
t
eA
s∗(s−t)Dsids
)
dτ −
∫ t
0
eA
s∗(t−τ)hsidτ
))
.
Then we solve the integrals and obtain
‖(T5x− T5y)(t)‖
≤ γκ
2‖x− y‖∞
Nd +N s
(
Nd∑
i=1
fφ
di
(
1
ρ2
‖Bd‖2r−1
(
MKd‖hdi‖+ ‖Ddi‖
)
+
1
ρ
‖hdi‖
)
+
Ns∑
i=1
fφ
si
(
1
ρ2
‖Bs‖2r−1
(
MKs‖hsi‖+ ‖Dsi‖
)
+
1
ρ
‖hsi‖
))
,
where ‖eA∗(θ)t‖ ≤ κe−ρt, ∀t ≥ 0 due to A7, ‖Kd(t)‖ ≤ MKd , ‖Ks(t)‖ ≤ MKs for all 0 ≤
t ≤ T , Mhd = max1≤i≤Nd‖hdi‖, Mhs = max1≤i≤Ns‖hsi‖, MDd = max1≤i≤Nd‖Ddi‖, MDs =
max1≤i≤Ns‖Dsi‖. All the bounds given above exist due to A6.
Now employing A5 we have the bound below using the Lipschitz continuity of fφdi , 1 ≤ i ≤
Nd and fφsi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N s with Lipschitz constants Lip(fφdi ), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nd and
Lip(fφ
si ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N s:
‖(T5x− T5y)(t)‖
≤ γκ
2‖x− y‖∞
Nd +N s
(
Nd∑
i=1
Lip(fφ
di ) ·
(
1
ρ2
‖Bd‖2r−1
(
MKd‖hdi‖+ ‖Ddi‖
)
+
1
ρ
‖hdi‖
)
+
Ns∑
i=1
Lip(fφ
si ) ·
(
1
ρ2
‖Bs‖2r−1
(
MKs‖hsi‖+ ‖Dsi‖
)
+
1
ρ
‖hsi‖
))
.
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Now we insert M
Lip(fφd )
= max1≤i≤Nd‖Lip(fφdi )‖, MLip(fφs ) = max1≤i≤Ns‖Lip(fφsi )‖ and
obtain
‖(T5x− T5y)(t)‖
≤ γκ
2‖x− y‖∞
Nd +N s
(
NdM
Lip(fφd )
·
(
1
ρ2
‖Bd‖2r−1
(
MKdMhd +MDd
)
+
1
ρ
Mhd
)
+N sMLip(fφs ) ·
(
1
ρ2
‖Bs‖2r−1
(
MKsMhs +MDs
)
+
1
ρ
Mhs
))
.
Then from A8 it follows that T5 is a contraction and therefore has a unique fixed point
p ∈ Cb[0,∞).
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